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The Conditional Influence of Issue Frames
Donald P+ Haider-Markel and Mark R+ Joslyn
University of Kansas
Political events and policy discussion set parameters for debate and help to determine how an issue
comes to be defined. Though existing research has examined the effects of alternative representa-
tions of political issues on public opinion, less attention has been given to highly salient issues,
such as gun policy, and the potential effect of framing on causal attributions of blame for tragic
events. This study expands the framing research to include opinion on policies concerning guns as
well as the attributions of blame following the school shooting in Littleton, Colorado. We test
several hypotheses using data from two field polls—one examining support for concealed handgun
laws and the other examining blame attribution following the shootings at Columbine High School.
We find that alternative gun frames influence opinion about concealed handgun laws as well as
attributions of blame for Columbine. However, the effect is conditional, hinging on the nature of
respondents’ predisposition and existing knowledge. We consider these findings within the context
of the policy-making process.
“The aftermath of that shooting . . . has had an even more profound impact on the country
than all the school shootings last year did. And you can see it by what is happening in the
Congress now.”
—President Clinton referring to the impact of the Littleton, Colorado, school shootings
on the gun policy debate (Sobieraj 1999)
“I have to tell you, it’s amazing to us, there’s a whole lot of us going “Wow” . . . After all
these school shootings we thought maybe we could get a discussion going, introduce some
ideas, but this is tremendous.”
—Janet Parshall of the Family Research Council after the House passed three religious
amendments meant to reduce school violence following the Littleton shootings (Rosin
1999)
Recent years have witnessed a troubling series of mass shootings. In April
1999, an exceptional case occurred in Littleton, Colorado, when two high school
seniors opened fire in their high school, killing thirteen before taking their own
lives. This tragedy, combined with several others, powerfully illustrates the force
of exogenous events on issue salience, agenda setting, and policy formulation
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(Jones 1994; Kingdon 1995; Riker 1986). After the Columbine High shootings,
the percentage of the public citing crime0violence and gun control as the most
important issue confronting government increased dramatically (Saad 1999).
Clearly, such focusing events as Columbine help frame issues involving guns.
Immediately following mass shootings, various interests advance interpreta-
tions of events that promote their policy goals, emphasizing, for example, threats
to public safety, second amendment rights, and the causal antecedents ulti-
mately responsible for the tragedy (Patterson 1998; Spitzer 1998). Yet, curi-
ously, there has been no research examining the influence of alternative issue
frames on public opinion about gun policy. Though prior work has explored
several issues (Chong 1996; Cobb and Kuklinski 1997; Kinder and Sanders
1990; Nelson and Kinder 1996; Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997; Nelson and
Oxley 1999), a host of others remain unexamined.
Researchers have also neglected the potential effect of issue frames on the
public’s attributions of blame for tragic events. By highlighting limitations in
current policy, focusing events may influence the attribution of blame for di-
sasters, tragedies, or simple failures, and can be key to legislative success (Baum-
gartner and Jones 1993; Kingdon 1995; Portz 1996). Our interpretation of events
aids development of causal theories about why the event occurred and, sub-
sequently, what type of government action might prevent its reoccurrence (Gib-
son and Gouws 1999; Rochefort and Cobb 1994). Thus, this study does not
simply add another case to a growing literature on issue framing, but rather
demonstrates how alternative presentations of issues involving guns may influ-
ence opinion about related policy proposals and causal attributions associated
with tragic events.
We begin with a theoretical discussion of issue framing and introduce two
experimental surveys conducted in spring 1999. Our empirical findings show
that alternative gun frames do in fact influence opinion about gun policy and
attributions of blame for the Columbine tragedy. However, respondents who
possess partisan orientations opposed to the direction of the frame exhibit sig-
nificant resistance, as do the most politically knowledgeable. The effect of al-
ternative gun frames is thus a contingent one, hinging critically on the nature
of respondents’ predispositions and existing knowledge. We consider these find-
ings within the context of issue framing theory and emphasize the importance
of framing in the context of the policy-making process.
Issue Framing in Policy Debates
Issue framing refers to how conditions or events in society come to be un-
derstood by the public and political elites (Gamson 1992). Since political is-
sues are often complex, they are subject to alternative interpretations. Political
debate and eventual resolution therefore depend on which interpretation domi-
nates (Schattschneider 1960). Multifaceted issues are collapsed into accessible
forms, providing order and meaning to the often distant and bewildering land-
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scape of political affairs (Kinder and Berinsky 1999). Framing, as Entman (1993,
52) observed “is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them
more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular
problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and0or treatment
recommendation.” For example, we may understand AIDS as a public health
issue rather than as a social condition associated with declining moral values.
How AIDS is defined, and ultimately understood, can influence the focus of
policy proposals, who participates in policy processes, and who may win or
lose (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Portz 1996; Rochefort and Cobb 1994).
But why should public opinion depend so critically on how an issue is framed?
The limited cognitive capacity of citizens to attend and process relevant policy
information appears to be the answer (Fiske and Taylor 1991; Simon 1957).
Although there are a variety of beliefs or considerations that citizens could
reasonably access when responding to a question about a given issue, frames
appear to prime a specific subset of considerations that will have relatively
more influence on the subsequent opinions of respondents. Because opinion
expression frequently requires negotiation among competing, often inconsis-
tent, considerations, many citizens are ambivalent (Alvarez and Brehm 1995;
Feldman and Zaller 1992). Frames provide direction by assigning relative im-
portance to particular considerations (Nelson and Oxley 1999). In other words,
frames, by emphasizing a specific component of an issue, influence which con-
siderations are most accessible (Feldman 1995) or those deemed important to
the problem at hand by the respondent receiving the information (Jones 1994;
Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997).
However, framing effects are not unlimited. Respondents are anchored by
important political predispositions that serve as critical intervening variables
between opinion and information (Converse 1964). What is an accessible con-
sideration to one individual may not be to another, even though both may be
exposed to the same information frame. For respondents predisposed to the
direction or tone of incoming information, the impact of accessible consider-
ations or beliefs can be substantial (Zaller 1992). By contrast, it is far less
certain whether frames will be effective when predispositions are at odds with
presented information (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Zaller and Feldman 1992).
The effects of framing are thus about more than mere accessibility. The persua-
sive effects of any given frame depends on how the content of framed consid-
erations interacts with the predispositions of those receiving the message (Lau,
Smith, and Fiske 1991).
Although framing research has generally examined how opinions can be in-
fluenced by alternative depictions of an issue, we believe individuals’ causal
attributions may be affected as well. The most influential work on framing
attributions was conducted by Iyengar (1990, 1991), who examined how news
accounts frame judgments of responsibility for social problems. Iyengar dem-
onstrated that stories focusing on individual actors rather than abstract issues
direct attention toward individuals as causal agents. He concluded that such
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episodic stories evoke individualistic attributions of responsibility for the societal-
level problems emphasized in the news frame. These findings are consistent
with earlier investigations in social psychology that established attribution pro-
cesses are susceptible to accessibility effects (e.g., Anderson and Slusher 1986;
Pryor and Kriss 1977; Rholes and Pryor 1982; Smith and Miller 1979). For
example, Rholes and Pryor (1982) provided data showing that recently acti-
vated causal agents are given more weight in making causal judgments. More
recently, Strange and Leung (1999) demonstrated that brief episodic experi-
ences conveyed through news accounts selectively activated certain judgments
of a given problem’s causes and cures and the priority with which the problem
should be addressed. Given the deficiencies both in the deliberateness with
which individuals confront political information—via their limited processing
capacities—and the clarity of causal determinants underlying most political is-
sues and events, it therefore appears reasonable to expect activation processes
to affect causal attributions in ways that are similar to their effects on opinions.
Indeed, Abramowitz, Lanoue, and Ramesh (1988) found that media cues in-
fluence who voters hold responsible for personal economic problems by increas-
ing coverage of the economy. Voters are more likely to punish or reward political
leaders for their personal financial situation if they connect government eco-
nomic policy to their own pocketbooks. In a similar manner, elected officials
may be able to manipulate voters’ perceptions—and subsequent credit or
blame—of policy decisions, the consequences of policy choices, and even per-
sonal scandal by providing causal explanations, accounts, or “interpretations”
of events (McGraw 1991; McGraw, Best, and Timpone 1995). However, the
literature has neglected the potential impact of alternative depictions of blame
for tragic events on citizens’ attributions of responsibility for these events.
The framing literature has principally centered on welfare (Smith 1987), af-
firmative action (Kinder and Sanders 1990; Gamson and Modigliani 1989),
government spending (Jacoby 2000; Nelson and Kinder 1996), and civil liber-
ties (Chong 1996; Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997). We wish to add regula-
tion of guns to this list, citing several reasons to justify its inclusion. First,
distinct from the aforementioned policy areas, the temporal stability of opinion
on gun issues (Weisberg, Krosnick, and Bowen 1996, 154–55), and the noted
intensity of positions (Schuman and Presser 1996, Chapter 9) suggests consid-
erable resistance to political frames (Lau, Smith, and Fiske 1991, 669). Gun
issues thus pose a particularly stringent test of framing. Second, elected offi-
cials appear less responsive to public opinion on gun issues, suggesting that
elites may be making a greater effort to lead public opinion rather than follow
(Lindaman and Haider-Markel 2000), heightening the import of issue framing
(Jones 1994; McGraw 1991; McGraw, Best, and Timpone 1995). Finally, gun
issues received significant electoral attention in several high-profile state ballot
initiatives as well as the 2000 presidential campaigns and have been dramati-
cally magnified by recent tragedies (Kuczynski 1999; Lindaman and Haider-
Markel 2000; Lloyd 1999; Pierpoint 2000; Wagar 1999a, 1999b).
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Thus, our broad research question is whether alternative issue frames will
affect opinion about gun-related policies and blame attributions for shooting
tragedies. More narrowly, we ask the following: (1) whether support for con-
cealed handgun laws is greater when framed one way as opposed to another,
(2) whether partisanship and political knowledge moderate the influence of
alternative frames, and (3) whether frames influence attributions of blame for
the Columbine shootings.
Study 1: Support for a Concealed Handgun Law
All adults in Kansas represented the population of interest. The population
was sampled using a random digit dialing telephone survey from March 7 to
April 3, 1999. Our survey concerned several public policy issues and took 15
minutes to complete. The cooperation rate was 81%.1 Although somewhat bet-
ter educated and older than the general population, sample characteristics are a
reasonably accurate demographic portrait of Kansas (see Appendix for profile
details).
The content of the experimental frames was designed to mimic political de-
bate on concealed handgun laws (Kinder and Sanders 1990). We exploited cam-
paign rhetoric from recent state ballot initiatives concerning handguns. Gun
control proponents typically emphasized threats to public safety, especially the
safety of school children. One particularly memorable advertisement in a Mis-
souri initiative for allowing concealed handgun permits suggested citizens would
be able to carry Uzi semiautomatic pistols onto school grounds (Wagar 1999a).
Opponents repeatedly argued that carrying a gun is an individual right. The
successful theme in a Washington initiative was “guns do not kill, people do”
(Joslyn and Haider-Markel 2000), and some in Missouri argued further that
citizens are better able to protect themselves from criminals by exercising their
constitutional rights “to protect themselves” (Wagar 1999b).
We adopted such language to construct an individual rights frame and a pub-
lic safety frame. Prior to asking respondents their degree of support for a con-
cealed handgun law, they were randomly assigned to one of the following frames:
• “Concealed handgun laws have recently received national attention. Some
people have argued that law-abiding citizens have the right to protect them-
selves. What do you think about concealed handgun laws?”
• “Concealed handgun laws have recently received national attention. Some
people have argued that laws allowing citizens to carry concealed handguns
threaten public safety because they would allow almost anyone to carry a
gun almost anywhere, even onto school grounds. What do you think about
concealed handgun laws?”
1The cooperation rate is the percentage of adults contacted who agreed to complete the survey.
The contact rate, or percentage of households in which an adult was contacted and asked to com-
plete the survey, was 63%.
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Citizens’ rights are emphasized in the first frame, casting debate about con-
cealed handgun laws in constitutional principles. We label this as the individual
rights frame because it attempts to tap devotion to liberty and individualism
(McClosky and Zaller 1984). By contrast, the second frame stresses the poten-
tial consequences to society rather than individuals. The frame evokes issues of
pubic safety in general, while providing a subtle cue of recent gun-related trag-
edies in schools. We expect frames will increase the accessibility of specific
considerations—public safety or individual rights. Relative to respondents in
the individual rights frame, respondents in the safety condition should exhibit
greater opposition to concealed handgun laws.
Results of Study 1
Our preliminary data analyses revealed significant variation in aggregate opin-
ion between experimental conditions. Opinion distributions are exhibited in Fig-
ure 1. Note that the distributions are bimodal, which is consistent with previous
surveys on this issue (Spitzer 1998). Note also that the distribution means con-
form well to the intended direction of the frames. The one-point difference in
means reflects a significantly greater number of strong concealed handgun sup-
porters under the individual rights frame—approximately 10% of the sample.
Although extreme opinions and opinion rigidity tend to characterize gun-
related issues, it appears that alternative frames can influence opinion on con-
cealed handgun laws
To determine if opinion differences can be attributed to alternative informa-
tion frames, independent of other relevant predictors, we utilize a multivariate
model. Based on previous studies we anticipate a number of factors determin-
ing support for concealed handgun laws. Partisanship should play a role as
Republicans are more supportive of concealed handgun laws (Gimpel 1998;
Kleck 1996; Langer 1999). In addition, the highly educated are more likely to
oppose concealed handgun laws, while gun owners are likely to be more sup-
portive and women and older individuals less supportive (Danigelis and Cutler
1991; Newport 1999b). We also included a political information index, captur-
ing knowledge of political affairs (Price and Zaller 1993; see Appendix for
descriptive statistics).2
Given response categories for our question about concealed handguns are
ordered but do not form an interval scale, estimates are derived from an ordered
2 Our index is an additive score (0–4) based on the number of political knowledge questions a
respondent answered correctly. The political knowledge questions were: 1. Do you happen to know
what job or political office is now held by Al Gore? 2. Whose responsibility is it to determine if a
law is constitutional or not: Is it the President, the Congress, or the Supreme Court? 3. How much
of a majority is required for the U.S. Senate and House to override a presidential veto? 4. Do you
happen to know which party has the most members in the House of Representatives in Washington?
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FIGURE 1
Support for Concealed Handgun Law by Experimental Frame
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Logit model displayed in Table 1.3 As expected, gun owners and Republicans
are more supportive of concealed handgun laws whereas women and older peo-
ple are less supportive. More important, even after controlling for conventional
determinants, estimated differences between gun frames are statistically signif-
icant, correctly signed, and substantively meaningful. For example, the pre-
dicted probability of reporting strong opposition to concealed handgun laws—
the modal category exhibited in both frames—is approximately .60 in the gun
safety frame while reduced considerably to .41 by the individual rights frame.
3 Estimates derived from an OLS regression provide similar results—both in terms of statistical
significance and substantive interpretation.
TABLE 1
Determinants of Support for a Concealed Handgun Law
Study 1
Kansas Adults’ Variables
Ordered Logit
Coefficients t-Score
Gun Safety Frame .674** 3.559
(.189)
Gun Ownership 1.054** 5.463
(.192)
Female .915** 4.529
(.202)
Partisanship 1.809** 5.245
(.345)
Political Knowledge .387 .992
(.390)
Education .457 1.521
(.301)
Age .739* 1.787
(.413)
Pseudo R Squared .08
Chi Squared 106.38**
Log Likelihood 616.681
Number of Cases 445
Cut point 1 .307 (.423)
Cut point 2 .048 (.423)
Cut point 3 .464 (.423)
Cut point 4 .830 (.425)
Cut point 5 1.367 (.429)
Cut point 6 1.544 (.431)
Notes: Coefficients are Ordered Logit coefficients. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Two tailed
significance test  **Sig.  .05; *Sig.  .10. Question used for the dependent variable: “How
strongly do you support or oppose a proposed state law allowing citizens to carry concealed hand-
guns?” (see Appendix for variable coding). All variables are standardized on a scale from 0 to 1.
Gun Policy, Opinion, Tragedy, and Blame Attribution 527
Partisanship and Political Knowledge
Our next step is to consider partisan categories across the two experimental
frames. Given Republicans’ adherence to individual liberties and less govern-
ment (Carmines and Layman 1999; Feldman 1999), we expect opinion consid-
erations emphasized by the individual rights frame to reinforce this propensity.
Likewise, we also anticipate Republicans to readily accept an emphasis on pub-
lic safety (Haider-Markel and O’Brien 1997). Accordingly, Republicans, pulled
in opposite directions by competing, relevant considerations, should display
significant opinion differentiation across information frames. This same pat-
tern is likely for Independents but for different reasons. Independents, not pos-
sessing the type of political cognitions that may predictably counter highlighted
considerations, are hypothesized to accept considerations from both frames.
However, the situation should be very different among Democrats. Given
Democrats’ support for government and gun control, their natural inclinations
should be buttressed by the safety frame. But considerations emphasized by the
individual rights frame are inconsistent with Democrats’ predispositions on gun
issues (Newport 1999b). In other words, Democrats are not cross-pressured by
competing considerations to the same extent as Republicans, nor do they lack
sufficient predispositions like Independents. Our alternative gun frames should
then play a major role in shaping the political thinking of Republicans and
Independents, a minor role if any in shaping the thinking of Democrats.
To examine these hypotheses, we partitioned the sample by party identifica-
tion and estimated the effect of alternative frames. We are therefore comparing
the reported opinions of each partisan group across the two experimental frames.4
Although all variables were retained for model estimation, Table 2 presents
only the estimates that distinguish whether opinion differences emerge across
frames. The results show that Republicans and Independents’ opinions on con-
cealed handgun laws are most influenced by alternative frames and that they
are less likely to support such laws in the safety frame. By contrast, the impact
of frames is not evident for Democrats. Thus, while framing is a significant
factor for the sample as a whole, it is clearly most important for shaping the
thinking of Republicans and Independents.
4 This method of data analyses was favored over the traditional product term interaction for two
important reasons. First, our theoretical proposition concerned presumed differences within parti-
san groups across the two experimental frames. That is, how distinct are Republicans, Indepen-
dents, and Democrats’ reported opinions on concealed handguns from one frame to the next. By
sub sampling the data by partisan category, relative differences within groups across frames can be
ascertained. Second, the typical product term interaction specified within the full model yields a
comparison of partisan differences across frames. The resulting coefficient conceals the nature of
change across partisan categories, as it compares differences between partisan groups—as opposed
to differences within partisan categories—across frames. The product term interaction thus pro-
vides a significantly different interpretation of the data—indicating the degree to which alternative
frames inflame or reduce partisan differences—a perspective not explicitly addressed by our theo-
retical proposition.
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We also examined the degree to which respondents’ level of political knowl-
edge may condition the effectiveness of alternative frames. The politically in-
formed and uninformed differ in the amount and nature of information they
process and retain (Lodge 1995). High knowledge respondents possess a vast
store of information that can provide resistance to external information cues
(Converse 1962; McGuire 1968). As such, opinions are based on a broad
spectrum of previously acquired information, with new bits of information
having a diminished efficacy to affect opinion. By contrast, less knowledge-
able respondents are unable to draw upon an extensive information reserve.
Rather, they are more likely to accommodate new information frames (Kinder
and Sanders 1990). We therefore expect the highly knowledgeable respondents
to exhibit opinion stability across experimental conditions. Table 3 presents the
information frame estimates by level of political knowledge.5 As expected, the
estimate for high knowledge respondents indicates opinion stability whereas
the less knowledgeable exhibit significant differences across experimental
conditions.
To this point, the evidence demonstrates that alternative representations of
concealed handgun laws are significant predictors of support for such laws.
When framed as a threat to public safety, support for concealed handgun laws
5 Political knowledge was divided into two groups based on a mean split of the index. Those
above the sample mean were categorized as high knowledge those below were labeled low.
TABLE 2
Determinants of Support for a Concealed Handgun Law;
Partisanship Across Issue Frames
Study 1
Kansas Adults’ Variables
Coefficient for
Difference
Between Frames t-Score
Model
Chi-Square
Log
Likelihood
Democrats Only .290 .811 30.99** 180.209
(.358)
Independents Only 1.047** 2.181 28.47** 107.902
(.480)
Republicans Only .765** 2.873 35.26** 317.317
(.266)
Notes: Coefficients are Ordered Logit coefficients. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Two tailed
significance test  **Sig.  .05; *Sig.  .10. Question used for the dependent variable: “How
strongly do you support or oppose a proposed state law allowing citizens to carry concealed hand-
guns?” (see Appendix for variable coding). Only results for gun safety frame variable are shown,
but results are based on full model estimation.
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is low. Yet support is higher when the issue is presented as an individual right.6
Republicans, Independents, and low knowledge respondents appear most sensi-
tive to our particular presentations. Although these findings are important, we
also wish to explore whether framing influences attributions of blame. Specif-
ically, can framing alter respondents’ causal beliefs about why an event such as
the Columbine shooting occurred?
Study 2: Littleton, Colorado and Blame Attribution
A Gallup Poll administered in the days following the Columbine shooting
asked respondents the following open-ended question: “In your opinion, why
did this [the shootings at Columbine] happen?” The modal response category
concerned the parents and family of the two assailants (20%). Another 6% of
6 We argued that the content of the safety and rights frames drive opinion differences. However,
we cannot be as definitive regarding the specific content responsible for differences. The public
safety frame draws attention to the issue of safety generally, but also introduces a potentially con-
founding emphasis of guns on school grounds. To determine whether the secondary emphasis of
guns and schools was responsible for the opinion difference—as opposed to public safety more
generally—we utilized 40 undergraduate subjects in an additional experiment. Subjects were ran-
domly assigned to one of two framing conditions. One group of 20 read the precise public safety
frame introduced in this study then responded to the same question on concealed handgun laws.
The other group of 20 subjects read only the first portion of the safety frame, with “even onto
school grounds” deleted. If in fact respondent’s levels of support differ, then it may be attributed to
the content differences across frames. However, if not, we have evidence that either version of the
public safety frame affects opinion in a similar manner. A difference in means test showed no
opinion differences in this specific sample (m  4.9 to m  4.75, t  .31 n.s.). We are indebted to
an anonymous referee for drawing our attention to this issue.
TABLE 3
Determinants of Support for a Concealed Handgun Law;
Political Knowledge Across Issue Frames
Study 2
Kansas Adults’ Variables
Coefficient for
Difference
Between Frames t-Score
Model
Chi-Square
Log
Likelihood
Low Knowledge .958** 3.624 60.31 319.172
(.264)
High Knowledge .358 1.293 52.24 292.451
(.277)
Notes: Coefficients are Ordered Logit coefficients. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Two tailed
significance test  **Sig.  .05; *Sig.  .10. Question used for the dependent variable: “How
strongly do you support or oppose a proposed state law allowing citizens to carry concealed hand-
guns?” (see Appendix for variable coding). Only results for gun safety frame variable are shown,
but results are based on full model estimation.
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the sample blamed teasing from other kids, 2% blamed violence in the enter-
tainment industry, 2% cited lack of morality in the country, and only 1% blamed
guns. The remaining responses were too diverse to collapse into categories above
1% (Gillespie 1999).
Based on these figures, the public held parents most responsible for the Col-
umbine shootings.7 However, elected officials did not seek to exploit this par-
ticular attribution but rather focused on guns and the entertainment industry.
Congressional Democrats insisted that weak gun control policies were respon-
sible, while Republicans attributed responsibility to violent images in the enter-
tainment media. Though family and parental issues were not ignored (Rosin
1999), existing policy proposals addressing gun control and media violence
were evidently more easily accessed and utilized by opposing parties. So while
citizens were more likely to hold individuals responsible, elites active in policy
debates selected causal frames associated with existing public policy solutions
(Kingdon 1995).
Shortly after the Columbine shooting, we conducted a random telephone sur-
vey of adults in Kansas to examine the effects of framing on attributions of
blame. The questions were added to an annual state survey that examines polit-
ical views and consumer confidence. A total of 490 surveys were completed
from April 26 to May 14, 1999. Our cooperation rate was 84% and our contact
rate was 67%. As with the first study, the sample was somewhat better edu-
cated and older than the population but shared important demographic charac-
teristics (see Appendix).
Respondents were randomly assigned to three conditions: (1) a control group,
(2) a “blame gun laws” frame, and (3) a “blame violence in the media” frame.
Like Gallup, we opted for an open-ended response format. The following ques-
tion was posed to control group respondents:
“You have probably heard about the recent school shootings in Littleton, Colorado. Who or
what do you think is most to blame for why this tragedy occurred?”
The respondents exposed to the “blame gun laws” frame were read the following:
“You have probably heard about the recent school shootings in Littleton, Colorado. Many
people are suggesting that weak gun control laws should be blamed for the shootings. Who
or what do you think is most to blame for why this tragedy occurred?”
And respondents exposed to the “blame violence in the media” frame received
the following:
“You have probably heard about the recent school shootings in Littleton, Colorado. Many
people are suggesting that violence on television, in the movies, and in video games should
7 Gallup took a second poll at the end of April 1999. The distribution was similar to the previous
poll but categorical percentages significantly higher. Most respondents still blamed the parents or
the family (40%), but more respondents attributed blame to guns (4%) and the media (4%) (Newport
1999a). It appears respondents began to coalesce around particular causal attributions over time.
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be blamed for the shootings. Who or what do you think is most to blame for why this tragedy
occurred?”
Although these frames are relatively simple, they mimic the thrust of the policy
debate occurring in Congress, national media, and state legislatures following
the shootings (Lloyd 1999). Policymakers focused largely on the suspected causal
antecedents in the social environment, seemingly less preoccupied by disposi-
tional properties of the persons involved. The question we therefore ask is whether
these societal attributions primed by alternative frames shape respondents’ at-
tributions for the Columbine tragedy.
Table 4 displays the frequency of responses for several categories of blame
across the control and experimental conditions. Consistent with the Gallup Poll,
respondents across each condition were more likely to attribute blame for the
tragedy to parents or family. However, respondents were more likely to blame
guns in the blame gun laws frame than in the control condition (16.9% to 3.4%).
Gun related attributions were in fact second only to parents and family in the
blame guns condition. Also, the blame media violence frame appears quite ef-
fective. Approximately 9% of control group blamed the shooting on violence in
the media, whereas 26% did so in the media violence frame. Although the
differences are substantial, they may also be influenced by demographic and
political variations among the samples. To control for these differences, we
again employ multivariate analyses.
TABLE 4
Comparison of Respondent Attribution of Blame
Based on Exposure to Issue Frames of Blame
Attribution for Shooting in Littleton, Colorado
Study 2
Kansas Adults’ Blame Responses
Control
Group
Blame Guns
Frame group
Blame Media
Violence
Frame group
Parents0Family 40.5% 45.0% 47.5%
The kids0Mental Illness 17.6% 7.5% 9.5%
Society0Culture 9.5% 6.9% 4.4%
Violence in the Media 8.8% 6.9% 25.9%
Declining Moral Values0lack of religion0God 4.7% 5.6% 5.1%
Weak Gun Control0Guns 3.4% 16.9% 1.3%
The schools0security 3.4% 4.4% 1.9%
Government0justice system 3.4% 0.0% 0.0%
Gangs0peers 1.4% 0.0% 1.3%
Other 7.4% 6.9% 3.2%
Chi-Square 15.04** 15.94**
Number of Cases 148 160 158
Notes: Two tailed significance test  **Sig.  .01. Chi-square tests are conducted between the
control group and each frame group separately. Respondents with no opinion were not included.
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Our first model considers the differences in attributions between the control
and the blame guns laws frame. We constructed a dichotomous variable coded
1 if the respondent blamed guns or gun laws and 0 for all other response cat-
egories. In the second model, we estimate differences in media attributions be-
tween the control and media violence frame. A second dichotomous variable
was constructed with respondents receiving a 1 if attributing blame to the me-
dia and 0 otherwise.
The key independent variables document whether a respondent was in the
control group or one of the experimental frame groups. Assignment to one of
the experimental frames received a 1 and a 0 if in the control. Based on previ-
ous research (Danigelis and Cutler 1991; Newport 1999b), several political and
demographic variables were also utilized in the model, including party identi-
fication, gender, education, and age (see Appendix).
Study 2 Results
Binary Logit estimates for both models are displayed in Table 5.8 Estimates
show that the likelihood of attributing blame to guns is significantly greater for
Democrats and women. These two groups are strong supporters of gun control
measures and for this reason are likely to attribute blame for Columbine to
guns (Kleck 1996; Langer 1999; Saad 1999). More important, even after con-
trolling for important social and political characteristics, respondents exposed
to the blame gun laws frame exhibit a greater likelihood of designating guns or
weak gun control laws as the cause of the Columbine shootings. Predicted prob-
abilities reveal more clearly the extent of the impact. Holding all other vari-
ables at theoretically meaningful values—continuous variables are set at their
8 Our other option here was to follow the rationale of Whitten and Palmer (1996), who argue that
binary Logit artificially limits the response categories. Thus, in our case they may suggest using
multinomial Logit. Although we agree with their argument as it concerns vote choice in multi-
party elections, the theoretical rationale for how or why our issue frames might impact respondent
attributions of blame to categories other than guns or the media is not clear, nor our primary focus.
Nonetheless, we did construct a new dependent variable by creating a multiple category variable
(with four categories, including blamed guns, blamed media violence, blamed the kids, and blamed
the parents; a fifth category, “all others,” was used as the baseline). This variable was used in
estimating a multinomial Logit model. Although not shown here, the results are statistically and
substantively similar to what we found with binary Logit for our variables of interest (the results
are available from the authors). Interestingly, the estimates show that the frames also influenced
the likelihood a respondent would blame the parents, a relationship we had not discussed and did
not have any theoretical reason for examining. We suspect that the media frame increased the
probability a respondent would blame the parents because the frame may have primed respondents’
ideas concerning who is most responsible for regulating children’s exposure to certain media. Fol-
lowing this logic blame may be reasonably attributed to the parents. The gun frame also ap-
proached statistical significance in predicting the likelihood a respondent would blame the parents.
Again this would make sense if we consider that parents have the most control over whether or not
their children are exposed to guns.
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means and discrete variables at their modes—the likelihood of attributing blame
to guns increases from .03 in the control to .30 in the blame gun laws frame.
Column 2 presents the estimates for the blame media violence model. Women
and Republicans appear more likely to blame the media, while respondents
with higher levels of education are less likely to blame media violence. These
results appear to support polls that show gender and partisan cleavages concern-
ing the effects of media content (Cowan, Chase, and Stahly 1989; Gunther 1995;
Saad 1999). What is more, the media frame imposes an independent effect on
attributions. Respondents exposed to this characterization of the causes of the
Columbine shootings were predicted to be .16 more likely to attribute blame
for the shootings to media violence than those in the control group. In short,
TABLE 5
Determinants of Blame Attribution for Shooting
in Littleton, Colorado
Study 2
Kansas Adults Variables
Model 1
Blame Guns
Coefficients
Model 2
Blame Media
Violence Coefficients
Weak Gun Laws Frame 1.778** —
(.511)
Violence Depicted in the Media Frame — 1.312**
(.364)
Female .628* .814**
(.442) (.363)
Education .118 .371**
(.183) (.174)
Partisanship .182* .228**
(.116) (.101)
Age .010 .014
(.012) (.009)
Constant 4.927** 1.048
(1.257) (1.008)
Pseudo R Square .15 .18
% Correctly Predicted 88.69 83.10
Chi Square 22.96** 33.01**
Log Likelihood 176.78 239.79
Goodness of Fit 282.83 277.94
Number of Cases 283 290
Notes: Coefficients are Logistic regression coefficients. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Two
tailed significance test  **Sig.  .05; *Sig.  .10. Model 1 includes all respondents exposed to
the “weak gun laws” frame and the control group while model two contains all respondents ex-
posed to the “violence in the media” frame and the control group. Using an open-ended question,
the frame variables are coded as a 1 if the respondent attributed blame in accordance with the
frame and 0 for any other response.
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results suggest that both frames influenced respondents’ attributions of blame.
This is strong evidence that the causal theories and beliefs that often underlie
mass opinions can be shaped by how a tragedy is framed.
Partisanship
Next, we again examine the influence of party identification on frame effec-
tiveness. As before, frames are expected to reinforce partisan propensities, res-
onating with predispositions that are congruent with frame direction. Given the
partisan nature of congressional debate after Columbine, we expect the causal
beliefs underscored by the blame gun laws frame to bolster Democrats, creat-
ing a significant disparity in the nature of attributions between control and
experimental conditions. Similarly, the blame media violence frame should be
a potent force in strengthening Republican predispositions toward the media.
On the other hand, Democrats and Republicans are unlikely to show signifi-
cant differences between control and experimental conditions when the frame
direction is inconsistent with their predispositions.
Table 6 provides evidence bearing on these postulates. Estimates indicate
that Democrats are in fact most sensitive to the blame gun laws frame whereas
Republicans and Independents are not. As shown in Table 7, Republicans ap-
pear most influenced by the blame media violence frame, while the nonsignif-
icant estimate for Democrats suggests no apparent differences in attributions
compared to the control condition.
Clearly, alternative frames influence respondents’ attributions, yet effects are
conditioned by partisan predispositions. Consistent with the arguments used by
TABLE 6
Determinants of Blame Attribution for Shooting in
Littleton, Colorado; Partisanship and Blame Guns Frame
Study 2
Kansas Adults Variables
Blame Guns Frame
Coefficients Wald
Pseudo
R-Square
Chi
Square
Democrats Only 2.599** 5.568 .37 20.775**
(1.102)
Independents Only 1.184 1.829 .09 3.649
(.875)
Republicans Only 1.282 2.343 .07 3.674
(.838)
Notes: Coefficients are Logistic regression coefficients. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Two
tailed significance test  **Sig.  .05. The model includes all respondents exposed to the “weak
gun laws” frame and the control group. Using an open ended question, the frame variables are
coded as a 1 if the respondent attributed blame in accordance with the frame and 0 for any other
response (see Appendix for variable coding). Only results for issue frame variable are shown, but
results are based on full model estimation.
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Democrats in Congress, Democratic respondents in our survey were most re-
sponsive to the blame guns frame. Likewise, Republicans were most suscepti-
ble to the blame media violence frame, the same frame used by Republicans in
congressional debate shortly after the Columbine tragedy. Although we cannot
definitively assert that partisans in our sample were influenced by the congres-
sional debate, our simulation of frames does suggest that the actual representa-
tions utilized by elites are useful for influencing blame attributions of partisan
constituents. Our results also suggest that frames are unlikely to influence the
attributions of citizens who are not predisposed to the message. Thus, if elites
make use of partisan frames, they are unlikely to “convert” anyone. Rather,
frames are most likely to reinforce or activate partisan attributions.
Conclusions
Although guns are ubiquitous in our culture, the rash of mass shootings in
spring 1999 brought increased political attention to gun policy (Kuczynski 1999;
Lloyd 1999; Newport 1999b). We examined whether alternative information
frames might influence citizens’ opinions about gun policy and attributions of
blame for mass shootings within this highly charged political environment. Given
the temporal consistency and relative intensity of opinion on guns, one might
expect that issue frames would be ineffective (Lau, Smith, and Fiske 1991,
669). We nevertheless posited that influence was possible if frames were acces-
sible, political predispositions were consistent with the frame, and political knowl-
edge was low.
TABLE 7
Determinants of Blame Attribution for Shooting in
Littleton, Colorado; Partisanship and the Violence in the Media Frame
Study 2
Kansas Adults Variables
Blame Violence
in the Media
Frame Coefficients Wald
Pseudo
R-Square
Chi
Square
Democrats Only .784 2.726 .35 16.782**
(.475)
Independents Only .692** 5.067 .18 11.911**
(.307)
Republicans Only .726** 6.033 .17 12.674**
(.296)
Notes: Coefficients are Logistic regression coefficients. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Two
tailed significance test  **Sig.  .05. The model includes all respondents exposed to the “vio-
lence in the media” frame and the control group. Using an open-ended question, the frame vari-
ables are coded as a 1 if the respondent attributed blame in accordance with the frame and 0 for
any other response (see Appendix for variable coding). Only results for issue frame variable are
shown, but results are based on full model estimation.
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Our first study examined support for a concealed handgun law. The frames
mirrored language used in recent state ballot initiative campaigns. Opponents
of gun control raised the specter of big government usurping individual rights
while proponents underscored public safety, especially the security of school-
age children. Our results indicated that alternative gun frames do in fact influ-
ence respondent opinion. Republicans, Independents, and respondents with low
political knowledge exhibited the greatest sensitivity to alternative frames. Thus,
while frames may influence opinion, their influence is conditioned by predis-
positions (Converse 1962).
Our second study explored attributions of blame for the Columbine High
School shootings. Utilizing an open-ended response format, respondents receiv-
ing experimental frames were quite willing to attribute blame to primed subject
matter—media violence or weak gun laws. However, partisanship once again
conditioned the influence of frames. Democrats’ attributions were sensitive to
the gun law frame but not the media violence frame. Conversely, the media
frame, but not the gun law frame, influenced Republicans’ blame attributions.
These results contribute to issue framing and policy theories in a number of
ways. First, while issue framing studies concentrate on opinion, comparably
few emphasize causal attributions (Iyengar 1991). Political thinking is full of
causal mysteries. Particular linkages of cause and effect can induce specific
dynamics in the mass public, whether attitudinal or behavioral. The fact that
issue frames can activate specific causal chains underscores the importance of
issue presentation during policy formulation (Portz 1996; Rochefort and Cobb
1994). Characterizations of political events and tragedies are not simply rhetor-
ical representations but rather important determinants of citizens’ causal rea-
soning. Indeed, while congressional Democrats framed the Columbine shootings
as a result of weak gun laws, Republicans turned their attention to violence in
the media. Each frame endorsed a specific causal chain that advanced a distinct
policy objective. We discovered these frames affected mass attributions but that
they were especially effective in reinforcing existing partisan beliefs of cause
and effect. Thus, frames may contribute to partisan polarization and a sub-
sequent lack of consensus on inflammatory political issues.9
Second, our research raises the possibility of a link between the nature of
attributions and attitudes toward government intervention (Haider-Markel and
O’Brien 1997; Jones 1994; Portz 1996), but more research is needed. For ex-
ample, are individualistic attributions like blaming parents for the Columbine
tragedy associated with greater or less support for government action? How are
societal-level attributions of responsibility for Columbine—media violence and
gun laws—related to attitudes about government intervention in these policy
areas? Subsequent research may even ask whether beliefs about the causes of
9 Our results also reaffirm the import of frames in policy debate. The availability of accessible
frames determines who is mobilized to participate, and subsequently, the potential for policy change
(Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Jones 1994).
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tragedies affect presidential support (Iyengar 1991). In the present political con-
text of events such as Columbine, Waco, or the Oklahoma City bombing, pub-
lic assessments of presidential response to the causes of tragic events may be
increasingly important for determining presidential support.
Third, while we have presumed that frames selectively activate specific be-
liefs or considerations and that these considerations become the basis for opin-
ion, we cannot rule out the potential effects of framing on the perceived importance
of specific considerations (Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997). Although a de-
finitive adjudication between accessibility and importance models was not the
purpose here (e.g., Nelson and Oxley 1999), the mediating effects of partisan
predispositions and political knowledge do suggest that mere activation is not
the only story (Gross 2000). Our theoretical reasoning regarding differences
among party identifiers was in fact based largely on an understanding of what
considerations would be relevant to partisans, and that frames would make such
considerations more accessible. Our results generally confirmed this reasoning
and make clear that research hypotheses generated to investigate the effects of
framing on identified groups will necessarily include a priori assumptions about
the importance of specific opinion considerations. In other words, identifica-
tion of opinion considerations that are likely to be meaningful to respondents—or
groups of respondents—are necessary for a statement about when the frame
may succeed. We do not view our results as entirely in the accessibility or
importance camp, but as a contribution to a developing theory of framing effects.
Finally, this study deliberately exploited the stimulus of actual events. Much
of the framing literature examines opinion stemming from hypothetical situa-
tions involving tradeoffs or value conflicts. By contrast, the topic of our frames
was immediate, tangible, salient, and the topic of considerable attention by par-
tisan political entrepreneurs in Congress. One might expect the use of high
visibility issues may diminish the influence of frames. People might be better
equipped to formulate independent attributions of responsibility, especially when
provided an open-ended response, as in our second study. Frames are nonethe-
less effective in such circumstances. Our results thus indirectly implicate the
importance of policy entrepreneurs in advancing issue frames during periods of
extensive public attention. The stimulus associated with focusing events, com-
bined with the political dialogue that follows, provides a valuable and rich re-
source for future studies of issue framing.
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Appendix
Descriptive Statistics for Two Studies of Issue Framing
Number Percent
Study 1: Kansas Adults: Question on Concealed Weapons National/Kansas
Support for a Law Allowing
Concealed Handgun Permits National a
1 Strongly Support 93 18.0% Approve 22%
2 12 2.3%
3 38 7.3%
4 37 7.1%
5 40 7.7%
6 36 6.9%
7 Strongly Oppose 262 50.6% Disapprove 73%
Gun Ownership Midwest Only b
0 No 320 60.6% 60%
1 Yes 208 39.4% 39%
Partisanship Kansas c
1 Strong Republican 57 11.1%
2 Somewhat strong Republican 72 14.1% All Rep. 44.8%
3 Weak Republican 99 19.3%
4 Independent 103 20.1% All Ind. 25.2%
5 Weak Democrat 86 16.8%
6 Somewhat strong Democrat 51 10.0% All Dem. 29%
7 Strong Democrat 44 8.6%
Age
Interval level in years median years 45 Kansas d 33.1
Gender Kansas e
1 Female 350 64.3% 51%
0 Male 194 35.7% 49%
Education Kansas f
1 Less than 9th grade 1 0.2%
2 Some High School 18 3.4%
3 High School or GED 115 21.8% sum 96.4% 81.3%
4 Some College 140 26.5%
5 Two-year degree 56 10.6%
6 Four-year degree 111 21.0% 21.1%
7 Some graduate school 19 3.6%
8 Graduate degree 68 12.9%
Political Knowledge Index*
0 Questions correct 43 7.9% —
1 Question correct 55 10.1%
2 Questions correct 80 14.6%
3 Questions correct 150 27.4%
4 Questions correct 219 40.0%
Frame
0 Exposed to Rights Frame 250 48.3% —
1 Exposed to Safety Frame 268 52.7%
Total Number of Cases 518
(continued )
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Appendix—Continued
Number Percent
Study 2: Adults: Attribution of Blame for Columbine Shootings National/Kansas
Partisanship Kansas
7 Strong Republican 29 6.3%
6 Somewhat strong Republican 86 18.7% All Rep. 44.8%
5 Weak Republican 58 12.6%
4 Independent 155 33.8% All Ind. 25.2%
3 Weak Democrat 39 8.5%
2 Somewhat strong Democrat 56 12.2% All Dem. 29%
1 Strong Democrat 36 7.8%
Age
Interval level in years median years 47 Kansas 33.1
Gender Kansas
1 Female 295 60.7% 51%
0 Male 191 39.3% 49%
Education Kansas
1 Less than High School 24 5.0%
2 High School or GED 139 28.8% sum 95% 81.3%
3 Some College 166 34.4%
4 Four-Year College Degree 104 21.5% 21.1%
5 Graduate Degree 50 10.4%
Total Number of Cases 490
Notes: Both studies were random sample telephone surveys conducted in Kansas during spring
1999. *See footnote seven for the questions constituting the political knowledge index.
aData are from a NBC News0Wall Street Journal Poll conducted April 17–19, 1999 with 1,006
adults nationwide. The question asked was: “Do you approve or disapprove of the idea of passing
new laws to make it easier for people to carry concealed weapons?”
bData are from Gillespie (1999a).
cData are from the Kansas Secretary of State.
dData are from the 1990 U.S. Census.
eData are from the 1990 U.S. Census.
fData are from the 1990 U.S. Census.
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